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Abstract 
Natural resources like oil and gas are valuable commodities for a host 
nation because they can directly contribute to the economic well-being of 
that nation and indirectly enhance that nation’s economic standing, security 
                                                                                                                 
Heike regularly advises on production sharing agreements, concessions and license 
arrangements, M&A and farm-ins, joint operating agreements, oil/gas/LNG supply, 
transportation, storage and access agreements, trading and other commercial contracts and 
the underlying regulatory regimes in the relevant jurisdictions as part of investments in the 
petroleum industry. She has been recognized as a “Thought Leader” by Who’s Who Legal: 
Energy 2018. 
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of supply, and national energy security. However, the expertise and 
technology required to effectively explore petroleum resources and to 
exploit them are often beyond the reach of the relevant host nation, 
particularly where high initial capital expenditure or highly specialized 
methods of extraction are required.  
Foreign entities such as international oil companies (IOCs) may have 
access to equipment, expertise, and financial resources the host nation may 
currently lack and/or not be willing to “risk”. Importing these indispensable 
development tools, however, often diminishes the net value the host nation 
could otherwise have realized from the underlying assets. In response, the 
host government may seek to adopt “local content” policies aimed at 
capturing some of the business activities (and the value created through 
them) that would otherwise need to be imported. 
This paper explores the development and implementation of local 
content policies in the petroleum industry; compares and contrasts policy 
choices implemented by nations such as Brazil, Nigeria, Norway, and the 
United Kingdom; and looks at the impact these policies have had and are 
having on economic development in the countries that adopted them. 
Finally, it examines modern-day areas of challenge and concern for 
developing countries that seek to design and implement their own local 
content policies.  
I. Introduction1 
Oil and natural gas2 are critical commodities, currently meeting more 
than half of the world’s needs for primary energy consumption.3 Petroleum 
resources are expected to remain the dominant fuels for the global economy 
                                                                                                                 
 1. “Everybody looks at oil and almost entirely forget that the percentage of jobs the oil 
sector creates is relatively small compared to the population; the introduction of more 
sophisticated exploration methods makes it even worse.” Emi Ayalla, quoted by S. Kamal 
Hayder Kazmi, Leadership and Business Wisdom, PAKISTAN AND GULF ECONOMIST 
(February 11, 2018) http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/2017/08/28/leadership-business-
wisdom-35/. In addition, this paper is based on the authors’ own research and the key 
findings from Eduardo G. Pereira, Tonje Gormley (eds), Local Content for International 
Petroleum Industry (Pennwell, 2018). 
 2. These commodities are referred to collectively in this paper as “hydrocarbons” or 
“petroleum.” 
 3. In 2015, oil and gas accounted for roughly 55% of the world’s primary energy 
consumption. This amount has remained relatively consistent for more than a decade. 
WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, World Energy Resources | 2016 at 4 (2016) 
https://www.worldenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/World-Energy-Resources-Full-
report-2016.10.03.pdf. 
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through at least 2040,4 and procuring these resources is serious business as 
this sector accounts for roughly five percent of world GDP.5 Yet, despite 
their currently indispensable status for the global economy, hydrocarbons 
do not automatically confer wealth on the people of the host nations where 
they are found. On the contrary: according to a 2013 study by the World 
Bank, the petroleum sector typically gives rise to far fewer backward 
economic links6 compared to other economic sectors.7 Although the 
petroleum industry can generate much wealth, such wealth does not 
typically spread through the host nation’s economy as readily as that 
created by other industries.8  
Extraction of oil and natural gas typically requires significant 
investments of capital, technology, and expertise. Host nations starting to 
develop their petroleum resources may lack some or all of the instruments 
to undertake such investments themselves (including, for example, suitably 
qualified local expertise and locally produced goods), forcing them to rely 
on outside support from foreign or international companies for these.9 This, 
in turn, can create social and political unrest in the host nation as wealth 
from the nascent petroleum industry may well end up in foreign hands more 
readily than benefitting the development of a local economy. The same 
concern might also exist in well-developed petroleum nations that may lack 
the necessary skills, technology and/or infrastructure for job creation at a 
national level as these nations tend to rely on foreign support to a different 
extent and in a different manner. In part to counteract this risk, the host 
nation may develop “local content policies” (LCPs) to try to capture more 
                                                                                                                 
 4. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2017, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY 
AGENCY (2017) https://www.iea.org/weo2017/. 
 5. Depending on the figures used for world GDP, petroleum drilling accounts for 4.6% 
to 6.5% of global GDP. Investopedia, What percentage of the global economy is comprised 
of the oil & gas drilling sector?, INVESTOPEDIA (Sep. 10, 2018) 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/030915/what-percentage-global-economy-
comprised-oil-gas-drilling-sector.asp. 
 6. Backward economic linkage relates to a product that is being created in stages and 
refers to the positive effect an increase in production further down the line of fabrication or 
assembly has for the producer/manufacturer further up that chain (cf forward linkage, where 
the initial production is intended to strengthen investment in later stages of the 
manufacturing process).  
 7. Silvana Tordo, Michael Warner, Osmel E. Manzano, and Yahya Anouti, Local 
Content Policies in the Oil and Gas Sector, 3-5, THE WORLD BANK (2013) 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/549241468326687019/pdf/789940REVISED000
Box377371B00PUBLIC0.pdf. 
 8. Id. at 7. 
 9. Id. at 9-10. 
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wealth for itself.10 Such policies can be an important part of the petroleum 
business; but what are they, and how do they work?  
A. What is local content? 
The Financial Times describes local content as “the materials, parts etc. 
that have been made in that country rather than imported. A minimum level 
of local content is sometimes a requirement under trade laws when giving 
foreign companies the right to manufacture in a particular place.”11 While 
there is no universally-accepted definition of this term in the petroleum 
industry, “local content” or “national content” can be thought of as the 
added value that petroleum activities bring to a host nation in addition to 
the direct revenues obtained through sales of hydrocarbons belonging to the 
government of that nation or from taxes, service fees, state participation, or 
dues collected from companies carrying out upstream activities in that 
nation.12 This is the working definition used throughout this paper. 
B. What are LCPs? 
LCPs are policies created to promote the use of local content in an 
industry that might otherwise turn to foreign sources for goods and services. 
LCPs seek to attract investors into the relevant host nation industry (aiming 
for higher efficiency and possible lower costs in the future), while, at the 
same time, putting these potential investors on notice as to the minimum 
level at which they would be required to source products and services 
locally and/or work with local companies, if they chose to invest. There will 
always be goods and services that may be uneconomical or unfeasible to 
locally produce or develop at least at a certain stage: examples range from 
agricultural produce to support industry workers in countries where the 
climatic conditions are unfavorable and may therefore require continued 
importation of foodstuffs, to high-tech or capital-intensive tools that cannot 
be produced solely through domestic construction, like floating production 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See e.g., Damilola S. Olawuyi, Local content and procurement requirements in oil 
and gas contracts: Regional trends in the Middle East and North Africa, at 6-7 THE OXFORD 
INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY STUDIES (2017) https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/Local-content-and-procurement-requirements-in-oil-and-gas-
contracts-regional-trends-in-the-Middle-East-and-North-Africa-MEP-18.pdf. 
 11. FINANCIAL TIMES, Lexicon, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=local-content. 
 12. See e.g., John C. Anyanwu, Local Content in the Hydrocarbon Sector: Lessons of 
Experience, Mozambique Coal and Gas Seminar in Maputo, Mozambique, (February 27-28, 
2013). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
636 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 4 
  
 
storage operating (FPSO) units, as Brazil discovered.13 As we will see 
throughout this paper, there are many factors that may affect a given 
country and a fine and intricate balance needs to be struck to decide its most 
sensible and sustainable LCPs. 
LCPs include policies to encourage training and employment of host 
country nationals within the industry, as well as investment in developing 
and procuring local goods and services, and “transfer” of technology 
through assistance, investment, licensing, trade and/or training.14 Although 
Corporate and Social Responsibility (CSR)15 is directly connected to LCPs, 
they have different objectives and CSR will not be analyzed in this paper. 
In addition, LCPs might also be designed to facilitate and promote 
participation of state- and/or privately-owned “indigenous” companies 
together with foreign entities in the petroleum activities of the relevant host 
nation. 
C. Why do countries adopt LCPs? 
The reasons countries seek to encourage (and often require) the 
development and use of local content are as varied as the countries 
themselves. In general, however, it can be said that LCPs are perceived to 
be a way of promoting investment in, and the economic growth of, the host 
nation. They are meant to create jobs for local nationals in the petroleum 
activities and to further the development of entire new industries, such as 
banking, power generation, manufacturing or telecommunications, as well 
as to build technological capabilities for the host nation. LCPs seek to 
ensure the highest possible rate of domestic employment, strengthen the 
local economy, and help the host country become less reliant on foreign 
capital and expertise. In this sense, it is crucial to develop and support 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See note 129 for further details. 
 14. International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association 
(IPIECA), Local content strategy: A guidance document for the oil and gas industry, 
(available for download at http://www.ipieca.org/resources/good-practice/local-content-
strategy-a-guidance-document-for-the-oil-and-gas-industry-1st-edition/). 
 15. Financial Times, Definition of corporate social responsibility, 
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=corporate-social-responsibility--(CSR) (“[m]ovement 
aimed at encouraging companies to be more aware of the impact of their business on the rest 
of society, including their own stakeholders and the environment. [It] is a business approach 
that contributes to sustainable development by delivering economic, social and 
environmental benefits for all stakeholders. CSR is a concept with many definitions and 
practices. The way it is understood and implemented differs greatly for each company and 
country.”). 
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Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)16 as they should be a relevant part 
of local content development. 
There have been very few examples of host nations that, on finding 
petroleum resources in their territory for the first time, were able to draw on 
an existing industrial/manufacturing base and immediately direct and 
expand that base towards petroleum exploration and exploitation. This has 
particularly been true of certain offshore operations where existing shipping 
and maritime experience and infrastructure was available to support 
offshore operations, as was the case, for example, in the North Sea. 
However, most nations cannot count on the existence of such infrastructure 
and/or related industry to develop their oil and gas resources which 
increases the risks and complexities for all relevant stakeholders. 
Due to oil and gas exploration tending to be a high-risk capital-intensive 
activity, it is common for the host nation to draw on international 
assistance, experience, and financing to develop their petroleum resources. 
Given the dominance of established IOCs, high capital intensity and 
sophistication of often cutting-edge petroleum technology, specialized 
services and highly trained staff that are required to undertake these types 
of activity, emerging petroleum provinces will, at least at the outset, nearly 
always depend on foreign expertise. Some of these provinces may later find 
it difficult to move away from such dependency.17  
                                                                                                                 
 16. Organization of Economic Co-operation and Developent, Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises (SMEs), https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3123 (“non-subsidiary, 
independent firms which employ fewer than a given number of employees. This number 
varies across countries. The most frequent upper limit designating an SME is 250 
employees, as in the European Union. However, some countries set the limit at 200 
employees, while the United States of America considers SMEs to include firms with fewer 
than 500 employees. Small firms are generally those with fewer than 50 employees […]. 
Financial assets are also used to define SMEs.”). 
 17. U. Klueh, G. Pastor, A. Segura and W. Zarate, IMF Working Paper on Inter-
sectoral Linkages and Local Content in Extractive Industries and Beyond – the Case of São 
Tomé and Príncipe, at Appendix II INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (2007) 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07213.pdf. The case of Norway is an 
example of the law initially recognizing that foreign investors and their expertise were 
required but being selective as to their suitability. HK Nordås, E. Vatne and P. Heum, SNF 
Report No. 08/03 – The upstream petroleum industry and local industrial development. A 
comparative study, at 63 INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 
ADMINISTRATION (2003) https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/164495/R08_ 
03.pdf?sequence=1.  
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As noted above, revenue from petroleum operations18 may be quite 
substantial but this does not automatically lead to the creation of significant 
local employment or value-added opportunities.19 Nonetheless, sovereignty 
over natural resources tends to vest in the nation where those resources are 
located20 and governments may well experience pressure from their citizens 
to translate that sovereignty into tangible benefits for the nation at large. Put 
simply: people may reasonably believe they deserve a major share of the 
economic gain derived from their national resources and expect their 
government to get it for them.  
Due to its importance, this sentiment often shapes a host government’s 
approach to revenue management (i.e., the way in which the host nation 
will use the revenues it collects from the oil and gas industry). Although 
such revenue management may be essential for the welfare of the state and 
its citizens, this paper does not address this aspect as it falls outside the 
scope of LCPs. Nevertheless, readers should be aware that LCPs are a 
frequently-chosen vehicle for achieving some revenue management goals, 
as well as more traditional capacity building. In light of the broad scope of 
potential uses for LCPs, it is not surprising that an estimated 90% of 
resource-rich nations have turned to such policies at one point or another.21 
Another rationale for implementing LCPs, particularly in developing 
countries, is to provide protection for newly-established petroleum 
industries and related enterprises to develop while being sheltered from the 
rigors of international competition.22 Sometimes, the justification offered is 
the purported need of the host nation for time to master advanced 
technologies; at other times, it may be a desire to counteract subsidies 
provided to established international industries that are supported or 
                                                                                                                 
 18. For example, including bonuses or fees for rights to explore and develop the 
resources, direct participation in the petroleum contracts, taxes on the petroleum activities 
themselves, and profits from sale of the state’s share of production, if any. 
 19. Tordo, supra note 7, at 23-26.  
 20. This principle has evolved through a series of UN resolutions on resources and 
related issues from the 1950s onward, including the Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty 
Over Natural Resources (Resolution 1803 (XVIII) of 14 December 1962, UN Doc A75217 
(1962), 2ILM (1963), p. 223), the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order (3 Resolution 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, UN Doc. A/5217 (1962), 2ILM 
(1974), p.715), and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (Resolution 3281 
(XXIX) of 12 December 1974, UN Doc. A/9631 (1974), 14 ILM (1975), p. 215). 
 21. Olawuyi, supra note 10, at 1. 
 22. Id. at 5; see also Tordo, supra note 7, at 24. 
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sheltered by their own countries of origin.23 The success of local industries 
can allow a host nation to become independent of expensive imports that 
would otherwise be needed. Absent a preference for local content, much of 
the potential value a host nation may otherwise gain from its nascent 
petroleum industry could be lost, as such value would leak through 
petroleum companies paying third parties or countries for equipment, 
expatriates, and other goods and services brought in from abroad. Thus, 
LCPs can, at least in theory, increase efficiency in the petroleum sector, 
improve the host nation’s overall balance of payments, and mitigate the 
burden on foreign currency that reliance on external sourcing often 
entails.24  
LCPs may also be seen as a way to broaden the host nation’s economic 
base: requiring international companies to purchase goods and services 
from local businesses gives those businesses revenues with which to 
expand, modernize, and diversify. This, in turn, can enable the host nation 
to weather the effects of a sudden fall in international commodity prices 
that might otherwise lead to crippling losses, particularly where export 
revenues for domestic resources decrease while their cost of production 
remains the same.25 By encouraging expansion and diversification, LCPs 
can hasten the nation’s overall economic development, thereby helping to 
alleviate the effects of the so-called “Dutch disease” in which rapid growth 
in the natural resource sector overwhelms other sectors of the domestic 
economy.26  
  
                                                                                                                 
 23. Sherry Stephenson,. Addressing Local Content Requirements in a Sustainable 
Energy Trade Agreement, at 4 INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT (Jun. 2013) https://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2013/06/addressing-local-
content-requirements_opt.pdf. 
 24. In Nigeria, for example, industry experts estimated that before LCPs were put in 
place, “up to 90 percent of capital input went overseas via equipment purchases, consulting 
and service fees and expatriate wages.” Ugo Nwokeji, The Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation and the Development of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry: History, Strategies, 
and Current Directions, at 44 BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (2007) 
http://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/page/9b067dc6/noc_nnpc_ugo.pdf. 
 25. See e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Presented at the Annual Meeting of 
Arab Ministers of Finance in Manama, Bahrain (Apr. 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/pp/eng/2016/042916.pdf. 
 26. Klueh, supra note 17, at 6; see also Sunny Oputa, Local Content: A Vehicle of Hope 
or an El Dorado, ENERGY & CORPORATE AFRICA (2013) https://www.energycorporateafrica. 
com/local-content---a-vehcle-of-hope--or-. 
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D. What can be learned from the experience of nations with LCPs? 
This paper will proceed with an examination of key considerations in 
LCPs, including goals, definitions and methods used. It will look at the 
outcomes experienced by nations generally regarded as pioneers in LCPs, 
including the United Kingdom, Norway, Nigeria and Brazil, as well as the 
experiences of developing oil and gas producers like Angola, Indonesia, 
and Kazakhstan who have been eager to design and implement LCPs of 
their own. Finally, this paper analyzes ongoing concerns and challenges for 
LCPs in developing countries, identifying those elements that have proven 
to be of value in their design and implementation and those that have not. In 
short, this paper aims to provide the background information as well as key 
lessons learned for any country which is currently considering whether to 
adopt or modify LCPs within its own jurisdiction.  
II. Key Considerations for LCPs 
A. What are the host nation’s current resources and prospective needs? 
Policymakers considering LCPs should start with a frank assessment of 
the host nation’s wider resources and needs. A nation that already has a 
highly developed industrial infrastructure, for example, will have different 
capabilities and resources available than a nation transitioning from a 
largely agrarian economy. The former might set ambitious targets for rapid 
local participation in petroleum activities whereas the latter may be better 
served with policies emphasizing more foundational steps, like construction 
of roads and port facilities and training in industrial operations and 
management. The examples of the United Kingdom (UK) and Angola are 
illustrative in this respect. When development of the North Sea petroleum 
fields began in earnest in the 1970s and 1980s, the UK already had major 
ports, roads, and a large and relatively underutilized industrial work force 
available to support the new sector and to capture a larger share of the 
value-added activities than might have otherwise been possible. Angola, on 
the other hand, began the build-up of its petroleum industry from a far 
different position, having, at that point, only recently emerged from several 
decades of civil war. Beset by widespread poverty, Angola inevitably had 
differing needs for local participation.27 
Similarly, the host country should consider the extent and potential of its 
oil and gas resources. Does it appear that there are sufficient oil and gas 
                                                                                                                 
 27. The examples of the UK and Angola are discussed in more detail in the sections that 
follow. 
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reserves (or good prospects for future finds) to support a significant long-
term domestic supply and/or export business? If so, planners may want to 
focus on building a domestic petroleum industry and other related sectors to 
take full advantage of these long-term prospects and/or any export 
opportunities. If not, it may be more prudent for that country to focus on 
LCPs that bolster short-term benefits for its petroleum industry (i.e. 
increase foreign investments) but also on LCPs that enhance other 
industries with a potentially long-term effect.28 On the other hand, if the 
host nation’s energy resources are small or its foreign supplies of petroleum 
insecure, it may wish to focus on matching its petroleum production to its 
domestic consumption in order to lessen the impact of fluctuations in world 
prices for the petroleum it would otherwise have to import. LCPs for a 
prospective petroleum exporter will likely be very different from those of a 
host nation whose immediate objective is to meet its domestic petroleum 
needs. For example, Norway historically aimed to reduce its internal oil and 
gas consumption by increasing the development of renewable energy 
sources for domestic use. This enabled Norway to export the maximum 
amount of oil and gas and establish itself as a reliable supplier while using 
domestic hydropower to satisfy its local energy demand. A different 
strategy could have been used, had Norway been keen to export petroleum 
products to harness the added value but this would have required further 
investments in its refining and petrochemicals capacity first.  
B. What does the host country seek to achieve? 
The previously-cited World Bank study on LCPs stresses the importance 
of clearly-defined and realistic objectives.29 Other commentators have noted 
that a lack of clarity in a host nation’s assessment of its objectives 
ultimately risks a misalignment between these objectives and the policies 
intended to attain them.30 Setting objectives requires careful evaluation of 
current conditions to reveal areas where the host nation needs improvement, 
and an unsentimental assessment of whether it has the necessary physical, 
economic, and human resources. For example, the level of experience and 
capabilities of host nations seeking to exploit their first petroleum 
discoveries will likely differ from those nations where petroleum 
development or production is already underway. Host nations with no or 
few domestic business entities devoted to supporting or participating in 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See Tordo supra note 7, at 9. 
 29. Id. at xvii. 
 30. See e.g., Olawuyi, supra note 10, at 3, 11. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
642 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 4 
  
 
petroleum activities will likely require different LCPs from those countries 
where petroleum activities have already begun.31  
A country with a relatively low level of industrial development may seek 
to first improve its educational system, physical infrastructure, and political 
and economic environment in order to foster local industry that can 
participate in petroleum activities. As the host nation’s petroleum industry 
and supporting businesses and institutions mature, it may seek more 
involvement of the local workforce in management and executive positions 
of foreign companies. This, in turn, can give local nationals the experience 
needed to lead the local petroleum industry to a level at which it can 
compete on an international stage. Some countries, like Norway, have used 
LCPs to build up their national research and development (R&D) 
capabilities so that they can compete effectively in the future.32  
Above all, LCPs should be dynamic: over time, policies should evolve to 
meet the changing circumstances of the host nation. This must, however, be 
weighed against the need to provide stability and certainty to attract 
potential investors. Host nations whose LCP regimes are plagued with 
uncertainty or excessive requirements may find that investment is harder to 
get as a result. Countries seeking to craft LCPs must be prepared not only to 
clearly define what it is they want to achieve and be cognizant of how their 
aspirations will evolve over time, but also consider the policy frameworks 
(e.g. by means of legislation, regulation or contract) that will provide the 
right blend of flexibility and stability.33 
C. How will the host country measure local content and audit its 
compliance? 
Another important consideration is what exactly the host nation means 
by “local content.” Not surprisingly, the answer may vary between nations, 
or even within the same nation, depending on context. “Local hire” 
requirements may be a key part of the policies; and for a nation suffering 
from widespread unemployment, hiring any citizen of the host nation may 
be enough to count towards fulfilling such requirements. If, however, the 
host government seeks to encourage economic development in a particular 
area, a more specific and limited definition may be used in which “local” 
means a resident of the targeted region. The term “national content” may be 
preferable where a reference to the nation as a whole is favored over 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See Tordo, supra note 7, at 3. 
 32. The Norwegian experience is discussed in more detail below. 
 33. Olawuyi, supra note 10, at 10. 
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specific subnational regions, however, this is not the commonly used 
terminology. 
Host nation expatriates living abroad pose special questions: would 
hiring such persons satisfy the requirements? If they remain abroad, they 
may not add as much value (in the form of taxes, spending, and social 
contact) as a national living in the host nation. How would that analysis 
differ, if the host nation expatriate returned home? On the one hand, hiring 
a returning expatriate will not produce a net reduction in local 
unemployment but encouraging the return of highly-skilled workers to the 
host nation may still be worthwhile to the extent it helps improve the 
overall labor pool (for example, by making such workers available to other 
developing industries in that country). LCP local hire requirements can thus 
be used to reverse so-called “brain drain” by providing a reason for such 
workers to repatriate themselves.34 The definition of “local” can be used 
creatively to encourage host nations to set goals that may not be 
immediately obvious. 
Similarly, when an IOC is required to contract with local companies or 
be present “locally”, the host nation government must decide what 
businesses will qualify. Is mere physical presence in the host nation enough 
to make a business “local?” If so, how much “presence” in country is 
necessary? Legal residence or place of incorporation, for example, are 
reasonably easy to determine; but would they suffice? Perhaps the situs of 
the “local” company headquarters or its principal business activities would 
be a better measure. Ownership may be a key criterion: some countries, like 
the Philippines, permit their governments to make agreements for natural 
resource development only with host nation citizens, or companies whose 
capital is controlled by such citizens.35 However, that raises again the 
questions as to what amounts to a “citizen?” Is it enough to be a host nation 
passport holder, or does it require tax residence in the host country, or both?  
If being “local” is merely determined by location, this may lead to 
another issue if the purportedly local business turns out to be no more than 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Michael Oluwagbem, Local content, diaspora ability & global capabilities, THE 
WORLD BANK (Nov. 17, 2010) https://blogs.worldbank.org/youthink/local-content-diaspora-
ability-global-capabilities. 
 35. In the Philippines, for example, companies entering into co-production, joint 
venture, or production-sharing agreements must be at least 60% owned by Filipino citizens. 
CONST. (1987), art. XII, § 2 (Phil.). In addition, Angola and Nigeria possess similar rules 
referring to a controlling interest by their own nationals and/or companies. See: Eduardo G. 
Pereira, Tonje Gormley (eds), Local Content for International Petroleum Industry 
(Pennwell, 2018). 
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a representative office of a foreign company that outsources all its activities 
to affiliates or other businesses abroad, adding little or no value to the host 
nation economy. This is why it is important to understand, for example, 
where products are being manufactured, developed and assembled as these 
steps should lead to a higher level of employment in and added value to the 
host nation. It is also important to understand the different stages of an oil 
and gas business and how it works in a practical manner in order to estimate 
where the maximum number of local jobs and employment can be found. 
For example, IOCs are less likely to undertake the majority of the 
petroleum operations by themselves but rather outsource such activities to 
third parties. Therefore, a higher focus on the IOCs instead of services 
contractors may add less value from an employment perspective. The 
proportion of local nationals employed in a business work force, or the role 
they play in its management, might also be used to determine whether 
inclusion of an ostensibly local business is sufficient to meet the host 
nation’s requirements.36 These are, of course, just some of the 
considerations that may be utilized by a host government in mapping out a 
definition of “local.”  
Similar issues arise when determining whether LCPs are being complied 
with or are meeting their designed goals. As a general proposition, the 
clearer the metrics employed, the easier it will be to monitor and enforce 
most policies; but metrics are not always just neutral measures of 
compliance or success. Metrics used to measure local content might include 
the (1) number of local employees hired, trained, or promoted; (2) monetary 
value of goods and services purchased locally by the international 
company; (3) participation of local companies in the relevant activities; (4) 
involvement of local institutions in R&D activities; or by other means such 
as the development and/ enhancement of other sectors (e.g. the shipping 
industry). A company’s employment strategies to meet a local hire quota, 
however, may vary significantly depending on whether the quota is based 
on total headcount or total payroll. As some commentators have noted, 
“often, metrics ultimately drive company and regulator behavior.” 37  
These metrics may need to be dynamic: in other words, they may need to 
be adapted as petroleum activities within the host country move from 
exploration through development to production. In some countries, 
particularly those whose hydrocarbon potential is not yet fully known, these 
activities will of course be gone through again as each new deposit is 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Tordo, supra note 7, at 2-3.  
 37. Id. at 65.  
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mapped out and developed.38 One of the critical challenges will be 
verifying compliance: how will the foreign investor (and host nation 
government) know if they are actually complying with the relevant 
regulations and contractual obligations? Especially in host countries with 
little experience in petroleum production, or whose educational 
infrastructure is not geared toward industrial activities, it can be challenging 
to employ the number of personnel necessary to verify compliance.  
Many host governments tend to rely on the information provided by the 
IOCs; Brazil, on the other hand, developed a certification system which 
helps the industry and the Brazilian government assess compliance of the 
relevant metrics agreed in the host granting instruments.39 There are certain 
companies recognized by Brazil’s national petroleum agency who can 
certify the precise amount of local content that is embedded in each good or 
service acquired for the relevant projects. In that way, this process 
facilitates the regulators’ monitoring task and provides more certainty for 
the oil and gas companies as they know sooner rather than later whether 
and to what extent they are compliant with the given regulations and their 
contractual commitments. 
In any case, LCPs should be targeted at each country’s needs and 
expectations. For example, in Brazil local employment or training is less 
likely to be an issue as the petroleum industry has been well developed for 
many decades and IOCs can easily find local and well experienced people 
to staff their company. It is cheaper and more efficient than hiring expats 
and this is why it is less common to find expats working in Brazil along 
with complex foreign work visa regulations. However, certain technologies 
and/or equipment might be a key issue to develop the petroleum industry in 
Brazil as they are not easily available locally. This is also the case in Iran 
which manages to produce quite well its oil and gas reserves but faces a 
number of difficulties in increasing the recovery from its fields without 
external support of foreign technology like fracking and pumping. By 
contrast, new petroleum provinces like Senegal or Guyana are less likely to 
be able to rely on their national work force to staff any petroleum company 
locally so these countries are more likely to add higher emphasis on training 
and local work force in comparison to Brazil or Iran.  
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. at 2-3. 
 39. Information concerning the Brazilian program is available online at the website of 
the National Agency for Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (available online at 
http://www.anp.gov.br/wwwanp/exploracao-e-producao-de-oleo-e-gas/conteudo-
local/certificacao-de-conteudo-local) (last accessed January 17, 2019). 
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D. How will LCPs affect petroleum companies in the host nation? 
LCPs can apply to any industry but pose special challenges for the 
petroleum sector: IOCs accustomed to working within a complex web of 
logistics and suppliers which they have built up over time may be required 
by such policies to deal with unfamiliar and sometimes less experienced 
local “partners.” The petroleum industry relies heavily on advanced 
technology, well-trained personnel, and carefully planned and sequenced 
activities. Involvement of new and untested parties in the supply chain 
tends to add risk: adjusting to unfamiliar local business practices can 
disrupt previously smooth-running processes, imposing delay and 
corresponding costs. Depending on their prior experience, the overall 
strength of the host nation’s educational system and other factors, local 
participants in petroleum activities may initially be less efficient than their 
international counterparts.40 Even in countries where LCPs and participants 
are well-established, such policies can still entail inefficiency and higher 
costs. The Brazilian General Accounting Office, for example, has 
concluded that that nation’s LCPs add costs and delays to petroleum 
activities within its jurisdiction which, in turn, discourage investment and 
indirectly limit revenues that would otherwise have been available to the 
Brazilian state.41  
Despite these potential pitfalls, LCPs can offer benefits to the petroleum 
industry. Although oil and gas activities are characterized by their reliance 
on technologically advanced equipment and operations, there is always 
need for unskilled labor. This is particularly true in areas such as 
transportation and the distribution and provision of unsophisticated or low-
tech supplies like food and water that are essential to petroleum operations 
and can be locally sourced at a saving over import costs.42 Developing a 
local supply ecosystem can save shipping and import costs, thereby 
producing immediate economic benefits, and promote competition that will 
lead to additional savings over time. Capacity-building investments such as 
the development of local suppliers and training programs (including but not 
limited to mastering skills to comply with procurement requirements, 
adding their profile into different databases from oil and gas companies, 
etc.) for the domestic workforce, which are often LCP requirements, can 
increase the local supply of suitable labor and reduce reliance on expatriate 
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employees who generally command higher wages. It is equally important to 
provide funds and affordable financing options for SMEs, otherwise it will 
be difficult for such “local” entities to comply with the required standards 
and be able to compete.43 Moreover, business consultants suggest that 
companies that overcome the “compliance mindset” and see LCPs as an 
opportunity rather than a hindrance can set themselves apart from other 
firms and reap the benefits of good host government relations:  
More broadly, a successful local content program can improve relations 
with local governments, leading to a smoother cost recovery process, 
preferential access to additional licenses and projects, and a reduced risk of 
industrial or social unrest. Finally, it can promote the development of a 
sustainable relationship with the country, enabling the company to plan for 
the long term.44 
While this may seem an overly-optimistic outlook, a prudent investor 
will always look to use the local legal environment to its advantage, just as 
it would do with the relevant aspects of the physical and economic 
environment. Doing so, however, requires a relatively stable regulatory 
regime within the host country: similar to other laws, if LCPs are unclear, 
conflicting, or subject to frequent change, the resulting uncertainty may 
reduce investor interest or confidence and curtail the availability of funds 
for future development in that host nation. 
To the extent LCPs promote fulfilment of public expectations about 
reasonably prompt and tangible benefits from the development of the host 
nation’s resources, they may also help to stabilize the domestic 
                                                                                                                 
 43. To address this situation, Nigeria, for example, created a local content development 
fund which is sponsored by the oil and gas companies through their upstream contracts in 
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fund for the same purpose. Miriam Grunstein and Cybele Diaz-Wionzzek, Local content in 
the petroleum industry – Mexico, BAKER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (Feb. 2017) 
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/c43bd724/MEX-pub-LocalContent-
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authorities is often required. Mike Odiegwu, Board´s intervention fund increases local 
content in oil sector, THE NATION (Mar. 22, 2018) http://thenationonlineng.net/boardss-
intervention-fund-increases-local-content-oil-sector/. 
 44. Douwe Tideman, Arthur Ramos, Georges Chehade and Rose Landau, Local content 
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environment in other ways. Resource development can disrupt existing 
socioeconomic patterns in the host nation,45 and draining its natural 
resources without an immediate corresponding return of value may seem 
inequitable,46 provoking civil unrest. A massive influx of foreign capital 
and workers can likewise cause societal frictions, and these may adversely 
impact the relevant petroleum activities. When LCPs help to alleviate such 
problems, “the benefits of maintaining social stability in a resource-bearing 
locality and … to retain a social license to operate may be more important” 
than the costs of compliance.47 
E. How will the chosen policies affect other aspects of the host nation 
economy? 
LCPs may contravene trade agreements or other obligations whose value 
to the host nation would have to be carefully evaluated.48 A policy that 
boosts the petroleum industry and related enterprises but leads to 
curtailment of trade in other sectors of the host nation’s economy may not, 
on balance, be beneficial. Thus, the petroleum sector cannot be viewed in 
isolation: LCPs must instead be aligned with the other economic 
development policies of that country.49  
Before adopting a set of LCPs, a host government would do well to 
analyze the likely costs and benefits of all the relevant policies that may 
already be available in its country.50 Unfortunately, there is no single 
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blueprint that can be followed to enhance industrial development: as with 
fiscal regimes in the extracting industries, the choice of LCPs and the tools 
to implement them very much depend on the specifics of each host nation. 
This ties back to the previous points raised in this section: the fundamental 
initial elements of an LCP are for the host nation (1) to know its own basic 
strengths and weaknesses; (2) to understand the specific needs of the 
petroleum activities about to be undertaken and the country’s ability to 
meet those needs; and (3) to have formulated the country’s overall goals 
and objectives for the policies in a clear and transparent manner. There can, 
therefore, never be a “one size fits all” policy. Each policy drawn up in a 
country and the experience gained in relation to it should be carefully 
analyzed as these policies should have been designed to address the 
particularities, context, and requirements of each nation. If the chosen 
policies do not achieve their intended goals over time, they should be 
modified or abandoned. 
III. Key Variables in Designing LCPs 
The political, economic, and technical circumstances that influence the 
development of a country’s petroleum sector will naturally vary between 
countries. Nonetheless, there are certain similarities of issues that have a 
bearing on LCPs and their impact on the sector. 
A. Control of natural resources 
Countries have the right to exercise permanent sovereignty over the 
resources within their borders.51 A threshold question is often how to 
determine who controls the territory in which a given petroleum resource is 
found. Investors can rightfully be expected to be leery of risking their 
capital on costly and time-consuming exploration and development until 
they know who owns the petroleum in question. This question comprises 
several layers, one of which is the delimitation of (maritime) boundaries. 
Licensing and development of North Sea oil and gas resources, for 
example, began only after Denmark, Norway, and the UK resolved their 
competing territorial claims.52 Once the question of territorial sovereignty is 
                                                                                                                 
 51. See generally note 20 and the discussion therein. 
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resolved, the next layer concerns ownership of and control over subsurface 
resources. This could be addressed in primary or secondary legislation. The 
Norwegian parliament, for example, enacted legislation vesting the state 
with rights to exploration and exploitation of offshore petroleum resources; 
the UK followed a similar path as the Crown owns and (through the 
government) manages its oil and gas resources via hydrocarbon 
legislation.53 Other countries, like Brazil, explicitly claim state ownership 
of oil and gas resources via their national constitution, sometimes as well as 
through petroleum legislation.54  
The mechanisms by which countries exercise their control over 
hydrocarbon resources vary. Brazilian national oil company Petrobras, for 
example, exercised the country’s monopoly rights to petroleum for over 40 
years before new legislation amended the constitution and created a 
hydrocarbon law permitting direct contracts between the state and private 
entities.55 In some countries, like Angola, government entities share 
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 53. Government of Norway, 1963, Act of 21 June 1963 Relating to Exploration and 
Exploitation of Submarine Natural Resources (Submarine Resources Act). 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/NOR_1963_Act.
pdf. Government of the United Kingdom, 1964, The UK Continental Shelf Act, 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/29/section/1 (last visited on 17 January 2018). 
 54. The Brazilian constitution gives the state ownership of “the mineral resources, 
including those of the subsoil.” See Government of Brazil, 2010. Constituicao Federal [C.F.] 
[Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil] 3d. Ed., Art. 20. (Braz.) 
http://english.tse.jus.br/arquivos/federal-constitution (last visited March 30, 2018). The 
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files/Angola_Constitution_2010_en.pdf (last visited May 22, 2018). 
 55. ANP (undated). “Legislation for Exploration and Production of Oil and Natural 
Gas.” http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/Brazil,%20Exploration%20and%20Production%20 
of%20Oil%20&%20Gas%20Legislation.pdf (last visited April 22, 2018). The legislation 
created two new institutions to regulate the petroleum sector: the National Energy Policy 
Council (Conselho Nacional de Politica Energética (CNPE)) and the National Agency of 
Petroleum, Natural Gas, and Biofuels (Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e 
Biocombustíveis (ANP)); but the decades of dominance by Petrobras mean that it still wields 
considerable market share and thus economic power. Wharton School of Business, 2003. 
“Now 50, Petrobras, the Brazilian National Oil Company, Has Aged Well.” 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/now-50-petrobras-the-brazilian-national-oil-
company-has-aged-well/ (last visited March 30, 2018). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss5/3
2019]      Local Content Policies in the Petroleum Industry 651 
 
 
regulatory control with the national oil company.56 Whatever their method, 
nations typically insist on keeping control of their petroleum resources and 
retain the power to impose further conditions before entrusting any rights to 
oil and gas companies.57 Whether the host nation’s authority is categorized 
as ownership or as an outgrowth of sovereignty and regardless of what 
entity is chosen to exercise that authority, the practical result is that any 
company interested in obtaining rights to explore for and/or produce 
petroleum must abide by the obligations imposed by the LCPs of the host 
nation.58  
B. National focus on petroleum 
Although petroleum is a valuable commodity, its discovery does not 
automatically translate into an economic bonanza, and the host nation must 
still determine whether to make building a petroleum industry a national 
priority. The presence of petroleum in the North Sea, for example, was 
known for about a decade before development began in earnest in the 1970s 
despite the UK government having started issuing exploration and 
production licenses as early as 1964.59 The initial pace of development was 
slow as nations adjoining the North Sea had little to no local experience in 
offshore petroleum operations (and, at first, little incentive to gain it either 
due to secure crude supply sources elsewhere in the world).60  
Early work in the North Sea was dominated by foreign companies.61 By 
1970, however, as the potential of the region became clearer, nations 
adjoining the new oil and gas provinces began crafting and updating their 
national policies for petroleum development. The Norwegian government, 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Lucy Corkin, After the Boom: Angola’s Recurring Oil Challenges in a New Context, 
at 12 OXFORD INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY STUDIES (May 2017) https://www.oxfordenergy. 
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 57. See e.g, Government of Norway, 1963. “Act of 21 June 1963 Relating to 
Exploration and Exploitation of Submarine Natural Resources.” http://www.un.org/ 
depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/NOR_1963_Act.pdf, para 2: “The 
King may give Norwegian or foreign persons, including institutions, companies and other 
associations, the right to explore or exploit natural resources. Specific conditions for such 
permission may be stipulated.” 
 58. However, the host nation must be aware that these obligations might reduce the 
attractiveness of doing business in that country. 
 59. Earle Marshall, North Sea Gas Discoveries, 22, No. 6 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 139 (1966). 
 60. Tideman et al. supra, note 39, at 10. See also N.J. Smith, Industrial Policy: Lessons 
from the North Sea, 10 No. 2 Civitas Rev. 1, 3 (Dec. 2013). 
 61. Smith, supra note 60, at 3. 
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for example, undertook a comprehensive reorganization of its petroleum 
industry bureaucracy in 1970, shortly after the discovery of the massive 
Ekofisk field.62 By 1972, Norway had two new agencies to deal with 
administrative aspects of oilfield development: a Division for Petroleum 
and Mining (initially created within the Ministry of Industry, but eventually 
spun off as a separate ministry) and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
(NPD).63 Norway also created a national oil company, Den Norske Stats 
Oljeselskap A/S (Statoil, now Equinor) to run the country’s petroleum 
business operations and ensure Norway received the maximum benefit from 
its petroleum resources.64 Similarly, concerned that its initial ad hoc 
approach to granting licenses was not capturing enough benefit from its 
nascent offshore petroleum activities, the UK established the Offshore 
Supplies Office (OSO) to monitor local oil and gas development.65 The 
OSO was authorized to intervene in procurement processes of IOCs by, for 
example, obtaining information on upcoming tenders, establishing criteria 
for bid evaluations, and suggesting additional national/local bidders.66 It 
became, in effect, a single point of contact for (mainly) foreign companies 
seeking to participate in UK offshore oil and gas procurement processes. 
The OSO and NPD brought focus to their respective nations’ petroleum 
efforts, helping them develop and enforce ambitious LCPs and both nations 
eventually developed successful petroleum industries making significant 
contributions to their domestic economies. In the UK, “British content” in 
the North Sea oil sector increased from about 40% in 1974 to over 80% in 
1986,67 and the petroleum industry became the country’s largest industrial 
sector, at its peak supporting employment of 450,000 people and generating 
several billions of pounds in exports and other economic activity each 
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year.68 Norway became the world’s third-largest exporter of natural gas and 
eighth-largest exporter of crude oil; petroleum now accounts for roughly 
47% of the total value of Norway’s exports,69 and Norwegian companies 
are some of the world’s leading providers of high-tech oil services to other 
countries.70  
Policymakers must consider timing and general market conditions when 
they wish to create a domestic petroleum sector, including the 
establishment of a national oil company, national petroleum agency and 
petroleum-related goods and services. As noted above, some commentators 
have suggested that local content regimes like those established by riparian 
petroleum-producing states to the North Sea (such as Norway, the UK, 
Denmark and The Netherlands) were able to thrive in part due to the then-
existing high oil prices and the fact that political uncertainty in fuel supply 
made abiding by such rules more palatable or, at least, not intolerable.71 
Conversely, low oil prices and secure supplies may diminish the leverage 
otherwise enjoyed by petroleum-wealthy nations to impose and enforce 
robust LCPs. Host nations should, therefore, balance their expectations 
against a realistic view of market conditions and design their policies 
accordingly. 
Therefore, timing and general market conditions likely play pivotal roles 
in the development of any new petroleum sector. Nonetheless, experience 
suggests that host nations can enhance their prospects for success by 
creating national agencies with a clear focus on the new industry, without 
conflict of interest if such role is performed by a NOC, and on reaping its 
benefits for the host country. 
C. Policymaking process 
Methods for creating LCPs run the spectrum from the informal and 
highly discretionary approach initially used by the UK prior to creation of 
the OSO, to more formal and structured models like that later favored by 
Norway, where over a year of parliamentary work and discussion preceded 
                                                                                                                 
 68. UK Department for International Trade, Guidance for UK companies involved in the 
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https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/oil-and-gas-sector-export-help. 
 69. Norwegian Petroleum, Exports of oil and gas, NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM (2017) 
http://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/production-and-exports/exports-of-oil-and-gas/. 
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the creation of the NPD. Historically, certain countries used to place 
responsibility for crafting LCPs in the hands of business entities rather than 
the government: in Nigeria, for example, the national oil company NNPC 
(Nigerian National Petroleum Company) was initially given authority to 
issue directives for “Nigerian Content,”72 while in Brazil, Mexico and Iran, 
Petrobras, Pemex and NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company), respectively, 
took the lead by virtue of their exercise of their respective state’s 
constitutional monopoly over oil and gas resources. However, as later 
regulatory reforms abolished some of these monopolies, the situation in 
most of these countries has since changed.  
In scenarios where LCPs are designed and implemented by government 
officials, there is at least a theoretical measure of public accountability: if 
the policies are inept or plagued by overt corruption, they eventually may 
harm the officials and their political masters. This can, however, be 
complicated by high levels of discretion, which are not always conducive to 
transparency, and by overly-ambiguous rules that can make all but the most 
egregious cases of malfeasance difficult to expose and correct. Moreover, 
there is no guarantee that officeholders and civil servants will be 
sufficiently well prepared, far-sighted or even available in sufficient 
numbers to craft the best policies, no matter how transparent and inclusive 
the rule-making process. Nonetheless, provided the officials are truly 
accountable to the public, badly-designed and badly-implemented policies 
are more likely to be corrected – either by the officials themselves, if they 
get a chance, or their successors.  
By contrast, in scenarios where LCPs are crafted by corporate officials, 
accountability to the public is arguably either nonexistent or highly 
attenuated, lessening pressures to fine-tune the policies or to make more 
drastic changes, if necessary. In addition, LCPs created by company 
directives may lack enforceability. A good example for this is Nigeria, 
where – absent the force of law – the NNPC directives made little progress 
toward their ambitious goals.73 Finally, the risks of conflicts of interest are 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Ugwushi Bellema Ihua, Local Content Policy and SMEs Sector Promotion: The 
Nigerian Oil Industry Experience, 5 No. 5 INT’L J. OF BUS. AND MGMT. 3, 5 (May 2010) 
(available for download at http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ijbm/article/view/5435) 
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 73. The initial NNPC targets called for 70% Nigerian content levels by 2010; but two 
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heightened when market participants are given authority to regulate the 
market as well. In summary, corporate-driven policies may be well-crafted 
by persons with expertise in the field, but they are not without drawbacks of 
their own. 
A last question in this area relates to the impact of direct input by civil 
society: are countries that (1) are clear on their policy goals, (2) present 
these goals coherently, and (3) consult over them with the public, ultimately 
more successful in achieving their goals than other countries? Given the 
disparity in circumstances between countries and market conditions that 
affect adoption and implementation of LCPs, there may be no clear answer 
to this. However, policies written for broad public consultation might well 
be subject to a more careful and analytical drafting and vetting process than 
those policies where no public input is sought. They may also benefit from 
factual issues or concerns being raised by public comment that might have 
otherwise been overlooked, as well as additional scrutiny once public 
comments are received. 
D. Policy content 
Just as there are many ways to create policies, there are many different 
options for policy content. All petroleum industry LCPs seek to promote 
local involvement in oil and gas activities for the benefit of one or more 
sectors of the local economy; but there are at least as many different ways 
to pursue that goal as there are countries with petroleum reserves. Initial 
policies were free-form affairs, with little structure to guide the IOCs’ in 
their compliance: the early LCP regime in the UK, for example, was a 
discretionary licensing system to favor companies willing to commit to 
rapid growth and use of UK-based suppliers, without formal targets or 
methods for measuring progress.74 In this system, prospective licensees are 
incentivized to submit the best possible package of benefits to surpass the 
competition and, at least in theory, this may lead to a broader offering of 
benefits to the host nation. However, such schemes may result in a 
mismatch where the benefits on offer, while attractive, do not meet any 
particular public need. Corruption may also become an issue: it may be 
cheaper for an international company to offer a benefit to the relevant 
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government official involved in the evaluation of bids than to provide value 
to the wider public. 
A structured system of LCPs to encourage use of locally-sourced goods 
and services without explicit numerical targets can be implemented as a 
midway alternative between pure discretion and a rigid system of quotas. 
This includes, for example, policies that impose preferences for local 
vendors and/or employees, provided they meet quality criteria that place 
them within a certain range of the lowest-priced foreign sources. Norway, 
for example, decreed in 1972 that oil and gas licensees would have to 
include Norwegian contractors in invitations for tenders to the extent they 
produced goods or services of the kind required. The decree further 
required use of Norwegian goods and services to the extent competitive 
with foreign goods and services in terms of quality, service, schedule of 
delivery, and price.75 Such policies can be weighted and implemented in a 
variety of fashions. Angola, for example, requires preferential consideration 
for Angolan companies in contracts and subcontracts, “provided that the 
amount of the respective proposal is not more than 10% higher than that 
proposed by other companies.”76 Kazakhstan imposes a statutory discount 
requiring a company tendering a contract for bids to “reduce the price of the 
bids submitted by those tender participants that are Kazakhstan producers 
by twenty percent.”77 In most of these schemes, companies are expected to 
buy and hire locally, with the proviso that the local content must meet 
certain minimum standards. It is not difficult, however, to envisage 
scenarios in which these standards are expressed in terms that effectively 
mandate foreign goods and expatriates – or exclude them – and thus 
undermine the flexibility that makes these forms of LCPs attractive. It also 
creates an environment where it becomes very difficult for local companies 
to compete on an “equal footing”. Moreover, policing these rules may be 
difficult and lack transparency, which can encourage favoritism and lead to 
corruption.  
                                                                                                                 
 75. See generally, Perrine Toledano, Sophie Thomashausen and Suzhe Jia eds., Local 
Content: Norway – Petroleum, COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT , 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/03/Local-Content-Norway-Petroleum-CCSI-May-
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 76. Angolan Ministry of Petroleum (Sonangol translation), General Regulatory 
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the Oil Industry, (2003) at Article 6, http://www.sonangol.co.ao/Style%20Library/pt-
pt/Pdf/licitacoes/laws_order127_en.pdf (last visited January 21, 2019). 
 77. Government of Kazakhstan, Law on Subsoil and Subsoil Use, at Article 78 (2010) 
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Some nations opt for policies that are setting numerical targets which can 
either be expressed in affirmative terms as quotas that must be reached, or 
in negative terms as ceilings that cannot be breached. Indonesia’s 
regulations for the petroleum sector, for example, include detailed 
schedules specifying local content targets as a percentage of total 
expenditures in each category of activity, with quotas increasing with the 
passage of time. The schedules include targets for specific activities and for 
broad categories of work: in off-shore drilling, the target is 45% local 
content (abbreviated from the Indonesian as “TKDN”) for each year in the 
period 2017-2020, rising to 55% TKDN annually in the period 2021-2025; 
while for on-shore drilling, the goals are 70% per annum during 2017-2020 
and 90% thereafter.78 Some nations utilize a mix of positive and negative 
targets: Angola, for example, requires entities covered by the country’s 
LCPs (which includes essentially all IOCs) to fill positions in Angola with 
“Angolan citizens duly qualified.” Hiring expatriates requires prior 
authorization of the Ministry of Petroleum for which the company seeking 
to make the hire must demonstrate that “there are not sufficient and 
available Angolan citizens with the skills and experience required for the 
exercise of office or position in question.”79 Foreign workers may comprise 
no more than 30% of a foreign company’s total workforce in Angola.80 
Numerical targets may be simple to enact and, at least in theory, easy to 
understand and enforce. However, the greater the level of specificity, the 
more difficult it may be to reach the quotas: a specific target may turn out 
to be out of reach, leaving a company that is otherwise complying in breach 
of the rules and subject to sanction. For the regulators, auditing complex 
rules may prove expensive or infeasible. Even when the rules are easy to 
enforce and to follow, there is no guarantee they will produce the desired 
result without careful drafting. A simple preference for local goods without 
adequate regard to quality or suitability, for example, may inadvertently 
cause more harm than good by making petroleum activities inefficient, 
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reducing profitability, and driving away investors. Conversely, sheltering 
quotas for local goods and services may slow down development of 
efficient processes and thus never allow the domestic companies to compete 
on an equal footing with international firms. Therefore, certain flexibility is 
required if a host nation desires to use quotas and a proper assessment 
should be made before establishing those quotas in the first place. 
In addition to overt rules, countries sometimes implement policies that 
do not explicitly take up the cause of supporting local content, but 
indirectly have the same effect. Angola, for example, requires workers to be 
paid in Angolan currency: this puts money into circulation for the local 
economy.81 They also tend to favor local hires, who need not worry about 
currency exchange rates and can, therefore, take full advantage of their pay. 
Norway prescribed petroleum contracts and other essential documents to be 
written in Norwegian, and also required fluency in that language for 
employment on offshore drilling platforms.82 Although such rules are 
theoretically neutral – anyone can learn to speak a new language – they 
nonetheless tend to advantage local hires and professional services 
companies like law firms, contract management companies, and 
accountants. The language requirement encouraged foreign companies to 
set up operational entities in Norway in which Norwegians played key 
roles, thereby promoting transfer of capital investment as well as 
knowledge and expertise.83 Finally, LCPs can be structured to promote 
overall capacity building and civic improvements, as is the case in 
Indonesia where local content scoring can be increased by up to 15% 
TKDN based on contributions to community development or providing 
after-sales service facilities in country.84  
E. Enforcement  
Even the best-designed policies are of little value without an effective 
enforcement mechanism to support them. Whatever their long-term value to 
the host nation, LCPs may turn out to be more or less economically-
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efficient from the perspective of an IOC and its immediate financial 
interests. Incentives to cheat or to game the system abound.  
LCP enforcement may be policed by governmental agencies that happen 
to have jurisdiction over petroleum resources (such as a national energy 
ministry) or by agencies specifically tasked with enforcement of local 
content rules. Alternatively, contractual provisions embodying local content 
rules may be subject to enforcement by courts of general jurisdiction, 
provided those courts have (or can obtain) the expertise necessary to 
interpret the relevant provisions.  
During the early days of North Sea petroleum development, host nations 
relied on informal enforcement systems. In the UK, for example, no legal 
sanctions were imposed on companies with low levels of “British content” 
in their activities or supply chain but it was generally understood that such 
companies would face difficulty in future bidding rounds.85 In Norway, 
R&D partnerships sought by the government for its nascent petroleum 
industry were “made a crucial and determining factor in the licensing 
process by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy.”86 As noted earlier, 
however, both the UK and Norway concluded that monitoring petroleum 
sector activities to ensure compliance was essential to the success of their 
LCPs. Other nations have drawn similar conclusions: in Nigeria, for 
example, “promotion of Nigerian content development” is “a major 
criterion” for award of licenses, permits and other interests in the Nigerian 
petroleum sector.87 A new agency, the Nigerian Content Development and 
Monitoring Board, collects and audits industry data to verify compliance 
with the country’s LCPs.88 Brazil outsources monitoring to third parties 
accredited to undertake that role by Brazil’s national petroleum agency 
under specific rules and guidance.89 
Monitoring compliance is just part of the enforcement puzzle. Nations 
use sanctions and rewards to punish noncompliance and encourage good 
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behavior. In Nigeria, for example, operators, contractors, and 
subcontractors who fail to comply with the local content requirements may 
be fined up to 5% of the project sum for each project in which the offence is 
committed or face cancellation of the project.90 Similarly, companies 
engaged in petroleum activities in Indonesia that fail to meet the TKDN 
levels specified in their contracts are subject to sanctions, including fines or 
revocation of their permit to engage in further activities.91 In Angola, fines 
can be imposed on noncompliant firms and companies with unpaid fines are 
ineligible for new contracts, and contracts that violate the local content 
rules can be declared null and void.92 On the other hand, some governments 
might provide incentives for higher compliance with the country’s LCPs.93 
By rewarding compliance rather than simply punishing noncompliance, 
such a government may be able to create a positive climate of cooperation 
and in the end reap the benefit of behavior that exceeds expectations. 
Such systems of rewards and sanctions seem logical and may be 
effective; but they pose challenges of their own. For sanctions, for example, 
at what level should the fines be set? Too low, and the penalties risk 
becoming an accepted “cost of doing business” rather than effective tools 
for securing compliance; too high, and foreign companies may choose to do 
business elsewhere. Worse, some companies may look for alternative 
methods of avoiding compliance, including attempting to bribe regulatory 
officials. Rewards for good behavior must be fine-tuned as well to avoid the 
risk of the host government “giving away” more than necessary to secure 
the benefits intended by the policies in question. 
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The initial approach by the UK and Norway, which considered 
companies’ historical levels of compliance when evaluating their bids for 
new work, may ensure more cooperation in the long run but such 
evaluations can be complex and difficult to perform. Countries that lack 
prior experience in petroleum exploration and development, or that have 
had relatively inactive petroleum sectors, may also lack personnel with 
sufficient expertise to detect noncompliance. International companies may 
choose to perform some activities outside the host nation’s jurisdiction to 
avoid scrutiny by regulators, route some of their business through shell 
companies or other entities to make it difficult to identify the ultimate 
beneficiaries, or simply change the ownership of the companies 
participating in each separate bid or project.  
The host country’s national oil company may employ (or contract for) 
personnel with the expertise necessary to detect such subterfuge, if it exists. 
As noted earlier, however, where the national oil company as a market 
participant takes on the role of market regulator, special care must be taken 
lest its immediate business interests conflict with wider national goals. In 
some countries, the national oil company may become more powerful than 
the government ministries to which it answers: 94 without clear rules to 
avoid conflicts of interest, inefficiency and the risk of outright corruption 
are heightened.95 Independent regulatory agencies may be better placed to 
withstand market attractions; but the question then becomes how much 
independence can be tolerated. In Indonesia, the former oil and gas 
regulator BPMIGAS was challenged as being far too independent of the 
framework of national law and accountability.96 Fundamentally, any form 
of regulation over a complex and lucrative industry like the petroleum 
industry can be corrupted and must be subject to scrutiny and ongoing 
review. 
F. Institutional coordination and stability  
Crucial though it may be to a host nation’s economic future, the 
petroleum sector cannot be viewed in isolation. Countries seeking to 
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develop oil and gas resources must consider their overall economic 
situation and national priorities, and craft LCPs consistent with the nation’s 
other development policies.97 Specialty agencies like Norway’s GSO or the 
UK’s OSO can be a valuable tool for monitoring progress of the nation’s 
petroleum LCPs, if they are given the resources and authority needed to 
gather relevant data. Such agencies may also be used to enforce the policies 
through fines or incentives, and to make or recommend changes to the LCP 
regime as needed. Coordination is essential to this task. Where the LCPs are 
focused on building infrastructure like roads and ports, they must be 
harmonized with the overall efforts of the country’s transportation ministry. 
If the host country needs improved schools, the education ministry must be 
involved; and so on. Although the national oil company may have enough 
expertise to run the petroleum sector, this does not guarantee that it will 
have the institutional knowledge or incentives to work with such a broad 
spectrum of government activities.98 An agency independent of the national 
oil company may be better able to operate as regulator and intermediator in 
coordinating various aspects of national policy.  
LCPs may not produce immediate or obvious improvements in the 
quality of life of the host nation’s wider population: this may be the case, 
for example, when the government requires investment in local R&D or 
capacity building such as making management training available to a wider 
number of participants. In such cases, the host government needs to be able 
to engage in long-term strategic planning (and to command the support of 
its people) to nevertheless achieve the full benefit from its policies. This 
means, in part, for the government to be able to adhere to policies that are 
making headway, even if they do not produce immediate results. Given the 
large up-front costs that are often required in exploration and development 
of petroleum resources, investors are likely to seek stability in the 
regulatory regime.99 Unfortunately, those countries that most require long-
term investments in human capital are likely to be those where prosperity is 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Tordo, supra note 7, at xiii. 
 98. Despite Sonangol’s expertise in the petroleum business, for example, it has been 
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Frameworks-in-the-African-Oil-and-Gas.pdf (last visited January 21, 2019). 
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most lacking, and where public patience is in shortest supply. Public 
participation, as noted above, may help governments secure the support 
they need to implement long-term strategies, provided the right tools and 
mechanisms are in place to allow such participation and to monitor its 
implementation.  
G. Other variables 
Finally, a nation’s choice of policies should be informed by the presence 
of any special factors that might affect the development of its petroleum 
resources. Norway’s success in the North Sea, for example, rested in part 
on world economic circumstances, including the (1) general downturn of 
business worldwide in the 1970s, which left financiers without traditional 
markets to invest in; (2) rise of oil prices in the same period, which made 
Norway a lucrative investment target; and (3) relative lack of expertise in 
offshore production throughout the oil industry, which opened up space for 
newcomers to break into this specialized area.100 These extrinsic factors 
served to make the timing of Norway’s oil and gas “extremely perfect for 
mobilizing what was needed to develop local industrial competence that 
could become competitive by international standards.”101  
Intrinsic factors can play a role as well. Regulations requiring use of the 
local language, as were imposed in Norway, may advantage domestic firms 
in a country with a single language not commonly spoken abroad. Yet, the 
same requirement may complicate work in a country with a patchwork of 
local languages or have little impact at all in a country like the UK, whose 
native tongue is widely spoken in other oil-producing countries. Economic 
and political circumstances comprise a blend of external and internal 
factors: as noted above, the UK had a conveniently-underutilized skilled 
work force available at the time the need to develop the North Sea 
petroleum deposits became apparent, and, despite difficulties in the years 
after World War II, the country continued to be an economic power to be 
reckoned with.102 By contrast, domestic strife in Angola and Nigeria 
destroyed or rendered unavailable much of their local work force and 
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wreaked havoc on their industrial infrastructure.103 The bottom line remains 
that there is, and can be, no “one size fits all” strategy for development and 
consequently no single LCP approach that could infallibly maximize the 
value added to a host nation’s economy. 
IV. Ongoing Concerns and Challenges for Developing Countries 
Before starting the design of LCPs, a government would do well to 
analyze the likely costs and benefits of all industrial development policies 
that may otherwise be available to it.104 Even if a decision has then been 
taken in favor of imposing local content requirement(s), careful 
consideration should continue to be given to the individual features of the 
adopted policy/ies. Once granted, special privileges “tend to become 
engrained and politically difficult to remove even in cases where their 
sustainability is in doubt.”105 Strategies so entrenched tend to survive long 
beyond their usefulness and, in the end, often hurt the very people they 
were meant to help.106 
Other key concerns that need to be addressed when designing LCPs 
include the type of measures they will be based on. This may include an 
assertive quota-based approach such as Indonesia’s or Brazil’s percentage 
targets and timetables, or encouraging an incentives-based approach like 
Indonesia’s inclusion of local community development efforts in evaluating 
competing bids. Finally, there is a need for policies to be set in a transparent 
and all-inclusive manner at realistic, achievable levels with the goal of 
creating true value addition and competitiveness in the host nation. These 
concerns are further explored below. 
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A. The importance of value addition and competitiveness 
Some authors have suggested that the general approach to local content 
in developing countries appears to be based on an assumption that domestic 
companies already have the necessary capabilities to supply the required 
goods and services, but somehow “suffer from a demand bias against 
sourcing locally”107 that seems to be inherent in foreign investors. LCPs in 
these countries, therefore, “tend to focus more on using legislative 
mandates to transfer economic activity towards”108 companies that tick the 
‘being local’ box, whether by name, place of incorporation or the identity of 
their shareholders. 
While these governments may believe that a mere enforcement of local 
ownership quotas is either identical with, or will infallibly lead to, capacity 
building (which is often where the real need in developing countries lies), 
true capacity building would ideally involve the creation and improvement 
of basic managerial, technical and operational skills and the development of 
vocational training programs for the benefit of the wider domestic 
population. 
There are many factors that may contribute to a country’s skills gap. For 
example, in order to have a positive impact on local employment in a 
particular sector of the economy an LCP may first need to focus on 
improving the standards of that country’s general education system and/or 
adjusting labor mobility, and create the necessary means to accomplish that 
mobility.109 In fact, LCPs need to be viewed in light of the broader 
obstacles that industrialization in many developing countries faces. Apart 
from raising educational standards, the increase in local content will often 
depend on significant improvements being made to, for example, public 
transport and road infrastructure to allow people to travel to educational 
and/or vocational training and work centers. Improvements are often also 
required to public security to make women and young girls feel safe enough 
to undertake journeys, or live, away from home. More generally, 
improvements may also be needed in the way business is done in the 
relevant country, and the levels of bureaucracy, transparency in general 
business practices, corruption, and access to financing that exists.110 
                                                                                                                 
 107. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Local Content 
Requirements and the Green Economy, at 11 UNCTAD (2014) http://unctad.org/en/ 
PublicationsLibrary/ditcted2013d7_en.pdf. 
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The choice of LCPs and the measures that those policies attempt to 
implement to plug any gaps that may exist should then, logically, be 
designed to address the nature and level of these gaps, rather than to create 
a one-for-all approach by mandating minimum quotas, for example, for 
domestic employment obligations and training budgets.111 Policies that are 
primarily focused on compliance of foreign investors with quotas, rather 
than approaching capacity building comprehensively as something that 
should and will benefit the entire domestic economy, may therefore 
compromise their own effectiveness. 
Some host governments favor the redistribution away from foreign 
investors of wealth that is created by industrial operations in the relevant 
host countries, and the passing on of such wealth to those local 
communities that were either actively involved in the creation of that 
wealth in the first place or in whose vicinity and with whose resources that 
wealth was created and who should, therefore, be entitled the most to reap 
the benefits of such operations. However, it is arguably the gradual 
reduction in the market power of large foreign investors that should be 
targeted instead. If not, the indirect control foreign investors exert by 
providing the income that is being redistributed in this way may, in effect, 
make the local economy more dependent on them rather than encourage it 
to stand on its own.112 
Upon their introduction, protectionist measures such as LCPs, even if 
they are well designed, are likely to use up resources rather than create 
immediate value. The expenditure initially needed to get local content 
measures successfully off the ground would, however, only be 
economically justifiable for a country or a foreign investor to shoulder, if 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Skills shortages across the hydrocarbon value chain are a well-known issue all over 
the world. That will have two main consequences: foreign investors may struggle to meet 
their own demands in relation to experienced expat technical, operational and/or managerial 
staff so may share a host country’s interest in building a local workforce but may also face a 
lack of available teachers and instructors to get such training under way. For examples on 
effects such shortages have, see Joseph Green, How does the industry address its single 
biggest challenge: the skills shortage?, ENERGY GLOBAL (Apr. 14, 2015) 
https://www.energyglobal.com/upstream/exploration/14042015/industry-challenge-skills-
shortage-leonard-607/; see also W. Chris Daum, Scott Duncan and Sabine Hoover, Skills 
shortages in a booming market: The big oil and gas challenge, HYDROCARBON PROCESSING 
(2014) http://www.hydrocarbonprocessing.com/blog/2014/06/skills-shortages-in-a-booming-
market-the-big-oil-and-gas-challenge. 
 112. See e.g., Marine and Petroleum Nigeria, Nigerian Content Policy Suffers Under Low 
Oil Prices, MARINE & PETROLEUM NIGERIA http://ww.w.marineandpetroleum.com/content/ 
nigerian-content-policy-suffers-under-low-oil-prices (last visited May 24, 2018). 
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the ensuing efforts actually led to true capacity building, cost savings and, 
therefore, value creation for all concerned, at least in the mid- to long-term. 
Having said that, the high upfront capital requirements and needs of the 
hydrocarbon sector for costly, complex technology, coupled with the 
prolonged low oil price and subdued debt markets in which the industry 
continuous to find itself, have caused the industry to become very cost 
conscious. Global supply chains in the industry are designed to keep costs 
down by buying high quality products in bulk orders from reliable suppliers 
rather than to artificially inflate costs by including in supply tenders local 
suppliers of unknown quality or reliability. And even if the foreign 
investors were to take on such increased costs, they would likely do so in 
the full knowledge and expectation that these costs are recoverable under 
the local hydrocarbon production sharing regime or as a tax relief. 
Consequently then, when designing LCPs in the petroleum sector, 
policymakers need to be conscious of not inadvertently creating measures 
for which that country’s costs of compliance actually exceed their public 
benefit.113  
If an increase in operational costs for foreign investors caused by virtue 
of local content requirements will, in one way or another, be paid for by the 
host country itself, it may make sense, at least in the context of some 
countries, to design more intrusive measures aimed at subsidizing fledgling 
home-grown companies until they are a more serious match for their 
international competitors, rather than forcing foreign investors to comply 
with often quite arbitrary quotas and other requirements resulting in an 
increase in their costs and expenditure (which they most likely will charge 
back to the host country).114 Other countries have created geographical and 
sectoral clusters to hasten the establishment of domestic and/or regional 
business centers and, at the same time, ensure their own technological 
advancement.115 
Having said that, the more complex LCPs become, the more difficult it 
will usually be, on the one hand, for regulators to administer them 
effectively but, on the other hand, for foreign investors to actually correctly 
interpret and execute these policies in the first place. Increased complexity 
                                                                                                                 
 113. For more discussion on this point, see Tordo et al., supra note 6.  
 114. This was part of the route the UK chose. 
 115. An example is Malaysia’s 2010 Economic Transformation Programme which sets 
out a number of steps and actions the country is undertaking to convert itself into such a 
regional and sectoral cluster. For further details, see Pemandu, 2010. “Economic 
Transformation Programme.” https://policy.asiapacificenergy.org/sites/default/files/ETP.pdf 
(last visited February 7, 2019). 
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could also lead to increased administrative costs and may consequently 
create a cash flow issue and, therefore, disadvantage smaller-sized foreign 
investors, at least in the near term.116 
B. The importance of transparency and of being inclusive 
Impact and general acceptance of LCPs tend to be much increased, if the 
process of policy formulation involves as many levels of government, 
society and industry and the process itself is conducted in an as transparent 
a manner, as possible.117 The process of LCP formulation should, therefore, 
be based on considerations that include whether host government ministries 
in charge of sectors other than the one in question (particularly trade, 
commerce, finance and, if appropriate, agriculture) are actively encouraged 
to contribute in the design of these policies in order to ensure that they will 
have the widest possible impact on the host nation’s economy. Another 
consideration is whether foreign investors will be allowed to participate in 
the design of the LCPs and, if so, be able to input in a meaningful way on 
the content of the proposed policy and/or any amendments to it.118 As 
mentioned before, it will of course be equally important to solicit input 
from those who are supposed to benefit the most from the relevant 
measures, i.e. the people of the affected local regions and other civil society 
groups. This is why LCPs should be well-linked with CSR policies and 
procedures. However, for any of these comments to be constructive they 
should be made on an informed basis, so ongoing education by government 
and local/national media, rather than alarmist reports or misinformation to 
raise fears or false expectations amongst the public, is paramount.  
The process of creating and administering LCPs and quotas must be 
overseen by public “institution(s) with a clear, limited mandate.”119 The 
statutory powers, duties and budgetary resources of these institution(s) as 
                                                                                                                 
 116. This is unlikely to present an ongoing issue though because, as explained on the 
previous page, in the petroleum sector administrative costs are normally recoverable under 
the local petroleum sharing regime or as a loss that is offset against corporate gains. 
 117. This is very much a live topic in South Africa. See e.g., The Africa Report, South 
Africa to publish contested mining charter by March, REUTERS (Feb. 6, 2017) 
http://www.theafricareport.com/Southern-Africa/south-africa-to-publish-contested-mining-
charter-by-march.html. 
 118. In the UK energy sector, stakeholder input is safeguarded by industry-wide 
consultations and the relevant regulatory body will be accountable for the way in which it 
dealt with any stakeholder input that it received as part of the consultation process. This is 
enshrined in law. See e.g., OFFICE OF GAS AND ELECTRICITY MARKETS (UK), Consultations 
Policy, (Nov. 6, 2018)) https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/consultations/consultations-policy. 
 119. For further details, look to UNCTAD, supra note 107, at 14. 
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well as the limits within which they are meant to operate and that may 
separate them from other parts of the wider government, such as national 
oil companies, should be clearly defined. This last point will be particularly 
important in those instances where the national oil company also carries out 
the functions of a national regulatory entity, as is still the case in Angola.120 
Management of local content is, even in developed countries, a highly 
resource-intensive task. Therefore, the relevant institution(s) need to be 
given sufficient manpower to be able to effectively carry out their mandate 
in this respect and ensure that their staff has the requisite technical and 
industry expertise to do so. All too often, however, the selection might be 
made on the basis of a candidate’s political or social affiliation, which may 
not be surprising in countries where political or social affiliates of members 
of government or of the ruling class more generally are often the only 
credible candidates in a host country to choose from.121 Decisions taken by 
local content institution(s) should therefore be made subject to a judicial 
review or transparent appeal’s process. Unfortunately, most resource 
wealthy nations are not as well ranked in terms of transparency and anti-
bribery practices as, for example, the UK, Norway and Canada.  
C. The importance of realism 
As mentioned before, perhaps the hardest task policymakers have to 
tackle is designing and setting local content targets at the right level for the 
relevant host country circumstances. This task is especially difficult in 
countries where industrial capacity is unusually low and the socio-
economic expectation, and often resulting political pressure, demand quick 
success stories from their local content measures. The decision of whether 
to give in to these expectations and pressures is often particularly relevant 
ahead of national elections when populist promises tend to overrule realistic 
targets.  
Instead of blindly going down the populist route, policymakers should 
properly assess the relevant “barriers to local development” in their 
countries and design “appropriate corrective measures, realistic policy 
targets, and the metrics to monitor the effects of policy implementation.”122 
They also need to address the question of how ‘local’ the local content in 
                                                                                                                 
 120. This is still the case, for example, in Angola where Sonangol is also the country’s de 
facto regulator in the petroleum sector. Sian Stephens, Sonangol: Angola’s Charm Offensive, 
NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE (Mar. 2016) https://resourcegovernance.org/ 
sites/default/files/documents/sonangol-angolas-charm-offensive.pdf. 
 121. For a discussion on this point, look to UNCTAD, supra note 107, at 14. 
 122. For more discussion on this point, look to Tordo, supra note 7. 
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question is meant to be, i.e. whether it should benefit the host nation as a 
whole (i.e. be described as ‘national’ content) or focus on a particular 
region. As previously pointed out, this process should, as a minimum, 
involve those key ministries whose sectors are set to benefit from the local 
content targets (and who will, therefore, likely strive for these targets to be 
high), and the foreign investors who will be capable of a realistic evaluation 
of what is achievable under the particular country’s setting and 
circumstances (and who will likely try to put a damper on the government’s 
high expectations). If the sources of input are too limited, the relevant 
government targets will go unchallenged and remain purely aspirational and 
often incapable of being accomplished due to, for example, the timespan 
that would be required to bring domestic companies to a level at which they 
were able to successfully compete in the international arena.123 
It may also become challenging for policymakers to find a way in which 
to manage widespread underachievement, if local content targets are 
unattainably high. For a host government not to penalize non-compliance 
could allow for capacity to build gradually but could also be seen as weak. 
Choosing to penalize such behavior, however, by, for example, 
disqualifying non-compliant foreign investors from future bidding rounds 
or imposing on them financial penalties or even prison sentences124, can 
communicate determination but may not actually solve the problem of the 
subsisting lack of capacity building in the host country. Some countries 
have, therefore, adopted systems in which local content requirements that 
are too strenuous for a particular investor or investor class to fulfil can be 
waived for them or can be waived under particular circumstances.125 As 
                                                                                                                 
 123. For the example of Nigeria, see Joseph Nna Emeka Nwaokoro, 55 J. OF AFRICAN L. 
128 (2011). Another example is Ghana. The First Schedule of the 2013 Petroleum (Local 
Content and Local Participation in Petroleum Activities) Regulations requires that within 10 
years up to 90% of “goods and services” that are tied to the petroleum sector be sourced 
locally, and prescribe a minimum domestic employment level of up to 80% of all “technical 
core staff” and 10% of all “other” staff within the same timeframe. 
 124. For example: Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation in Petroleum 
Activities) Regulations 2013 of Ghana, note 118, Section 46. 
 125. See the example of Brazil’s ambitious plan to construct 8 FPSOs domestically that 
had grown out of the local content requirement for oil and gas operators in Brazil to source 
up to 85% of equipment and services from within the country. This unachievably high target 
has now resulted in the application for a waiver in respect of the FPSO for the Libra pre-salt 
field. See e.g., WESTWOOD GLOBAL ENERGY GROUP, DW Monday: Not Content with Local 
Content https://www.westwoodenergy.com/news/westwood-insight/dw-monday-not-
content-with-local-content/ (last visited February 4, 2019); see also Michael Place, Brazil 
debates local content waiver for Libra pre-salt pilot, BNAMERICAS (Feb. 9, 2017) 
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always, care must be taken that such a waiver system does not actually 
serve as an incentive “for corruption, particularly where the criteria for 
evaluating waiver applications is not made public or is not applied in an 
objective or transparent manner.”126 
In addition, and as briefly mentioned above, the more unrealistic a target 
and the more painful the penalty for not achieving it are, the stronger the 
incentive may be amongst investors to circumvent that target. Ambiguity in 
policy formulation, imprecise wording, or targets/quotas that lack clarity, 
particularly in the question of which criteria have to be fulfilled by a 
company for it to be regarded as “local” or “indigenous,” may benefit the 
wrong people in this respect.127 Another issue is that all too often the only 
“local” people who are in a position to own and manage assets or contribute 
equity in a “local” company are the well-off and well-educated who tend to 
be related, or at least close, to the ruling elite of that country thereby again 
eclipsing the broader population for whose benefit the policies were or 
should have been designed in the first place.128 
Similar to devising a country’s fiscal regime in the extracting industries, 
creating LCPs that can be adapted as and when domestic and international 
markets and considerations change has proven to be a key to avoiding 
unrealistic goals at any given time and at any stage of domestic sector 
development. This can be done by including flexible targets (that self-adjust 
in line with market changes) or by subjecting the relevant policies to 
periodic reviews. The latter will require political resolve to actually carry 
through a modification of local content requirements, if a need to do so is 
indicated by the outcome of such reviews. This may be difficult to attain, 
however, where the need is one for downward adjustment since this may be 
                                                                                                                 
https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/brazil-debates-local-content-waiver-for-libra-pre-salt-
pilot. 
 126. UNCTAD, supra note 107, at 16. 
 127. For example, in Ghana to qualify as a Ghanaian/indigenous company, the company 
must have at least 51% of its equity owned by a Ghanaian with 80% management and senior 
positions occupied by Ghanaians. The legislation does not specify whether these Ghanaians 
have to be residents of Ghana. Petroleum Commission, Ghana, 2015. “Local Content.” 
https://www.petrocom.gov.gh/local-content/ (last visited February 7, 2019). 
 128. See e.g., Megan Zwiebel, Kevin Abikoff of Hughes Hubbard Discusses the Benefits 
and Risks of African Local Content Laws, The FCPA Report (Feb. 10, 2016) (available for 
download at https://www.hugheshubbard.com/news/kevin-abikoff-of-hughes-hubbard-
discusses-the-benefits-and-risks-of-african-local-content-laws). 
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perceived as the host government backing down under the pressure of 
foreign investors (and consequently is rather rare).129 
In addition, governments should be careful before including local content 
as a bid parameter to award a petroleum contract. Such rules could create a 
perverse environment where bidders might be “encouraged” to improve 
their bids with unrealistic local content conditions (e.g. bidding 85% or 
more of goods and services to be local). In this hypothetical case, the said 
bidder (i.e. concessionaire) might win the award of the petroleum contract 
with terms they know are not realistic and later claim that the local market 
cannot afford such conditions and ask for exemptions from having to fulfil 
the terms of their own bid which would create a complex scenario between 
breach of contract and unfair procedures vis-à-vis other bidders. This 
scenario played out on several occasions in Brazil as past bid rounds 
allocated 20% of the bid score to local content requirements.130 This is why 
Brazil’s authorities decided to remove such criteria from later bid rounds. 
Policies that take a balanced approach, that are phased in131 and adjusted 
in line with changing market conditions and phased out if no longer needed, 
tend to have at their center of attention a stable industrialization of the 
domestic economy and ensuing long-term prosperity of the host country 
rather than pursuit of unattainably high goals for quick, often politically 
motivated, impact but little actual effect on most people’s living standard. 
V. Conclusion 
There are many examples (including Brazil, Norway, and the UK), in 
which LCPs in the petroleum sector have demonstrated the capacity to 
trigger widespread and beneficial economic changes. However, their 
introduction into other oil and gas provinces of the world has, by and large, 
underachieved. The outcome of a World Bank analysis132 of LCPs in 
                                                                                                                 
 129. It is therefore worth noting the recent move by Brazil’s government to modify 
minimum local content percentages for oil and gas companies with the aim of boosting 
investment. David Casallas, Brazil sets new upstream local content percentages, 
BNAMERICAS (Feb. 23, 2017). 
 130. See Perrine Toledano and Sophie Thomashausen, Local Content Brazil – Petroleum, 
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/03/ 
Local-Content-Brazil-Petroleum-CCSI-May-2017.pdf. (last accessed July 30, 2017). 
 131. Ghana’s 2013 Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation in Petroleum 
Activities) Regulations, for example, provide for a staggered approach to local goods and 
services: 10% at the start, 50% after 5 years, increasing to 60-90% at the 10-year threshold 
in the First Schedule Part 1. See supra note 118. 
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petroleum sectors across 48 countries world-wide suggests that poor 
performance of such policies may be due to their key drivers being political 
imperatives rather than considerations of economic efficiency, which were 
often treated only as afterthoughts. In addition, the authors of that study133 
seemed unable to find evidence that countries which had adopted LCPs 
actually made any prior attempt to assess and compare costs and potential 
benefits of local content with those of alternative policy options. The less 
developed the economy of a host country, particularly of a new 
hydrocarbon province, the more assertive the LCP134 which that country has 
adopted tends to be, “imposing measures that limit investors’ choices with 
respect to employment, purchasing strategies, localization, and the transfer 
of knowledge” in a particularly unfavorable way. This may be designed to 
force foreign investors to help advance that country’s economy rather than 
incentivize them to do so by creating win-win situations (including but not 
limited to creating incentives to increase local content implementation).  
Yet, there is hope for the future of LCPs. If there is one area of 
commonality that naturally exists between host governments and foreign 
companies, it often is a strong long-term interest in increasing local content. 
Whereas for governments this is usually driven by political aspirations, for 
foreign investors it will present a means to, amongst other goals, cutting 
costs (including for expat staff), avoiding constant border and visa delays 
and increasing ties with local markets. Instead of expecting, however, that 
this long-term objective investors and the host government have in common 
will instantly bear fruit, simply because wide-ranging local content 
obligations are being imposed by law or regulation, governments would do 
better to focus on improving basic infrastructure and address trade/industry 
policy deficiencies to create the kind of business environment in which 
companies can thrive and foreign investors will be keen to invest. 
Otherwise overly-aggressive local content targets will further burden 
foreign investors with an additional expense of doing business in that 
country, causing them to either reduce their exposure to that host country or 
experience a reduction in the profits they can realize there, which would 
ultimately lead to pressure from shareholders or lenders in their home 
country or countries to shrink investment in the relevant host country even 
more, something that usually comes to a head at times, such as now, of low 
commodity prices.135136 This is why LCPs should have realistic short-, mid-, 
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and long-term goals and encourage a cooperative compliance mentality 
rather than a punitive one.  
Therefore, LCPs should be developed consistent within the context of 
each individual country against its own economic, social and political 
background. Lessons from other countries could be relevant but they cannot 
be purely adopted in another jurisdiction without careful consideration and 
likely adaptations. The expectations of all stakeholders should be clearly 
understood and balanced, otherwise the introduction of LCPs may lead to 
further disruptions. Finally, LCPs should provide a reasonable progression 
with, and realism between the target goals and, the attached terms and 
conditions which should be suitable for each given jurisdiction and location 
of the petroleum assets. Failure to address such considerations are likely to 
cause market disruption, and inefficient and/or unfeasible procedures and 
might lead to a higher incidence of corruption.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 136. See Marine and Petroleum Nigeria, supra note 112; see also notes 40, 124, and 128. 
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